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16 June 1955

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## "SUMMIT" SUPPLEMENT




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SUMMIT CONFERENCE SUPPLEMENT TO THE  
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

16 June 1955

The following is a summary of information received during the week on Soviet bloc preparations for the four-power conference.

General Soviet objectives and attitudes

General observations from Ambassador Bohlen: Ambassador Bohlen believes that the two main subjects the Soviets will present at Geneva will be disarmament, and some form of general security treaty for Europe as a method of weakening or even undermining the present Western defense system. In addition, the Soviets are likely to raise questions of military bases on foreign territory, evacuation of foreign troops from the territory of other countries, particularly Germany, and standard Soviet points such as nondiscrimination in trade, renunciation of war propaganda and cultural exchanges. Bohlen believes that the Soviets will refuse categorically to discuss the Satellites and that present indications are that they will sidestep unification of Germany as a question which should be worked out between the two German governments. It is virtually certain that they will attempt to discuss calling a five power or larger conference on Asian questions.

Ambassador Bohlen reasons that recent developments in Soviet foreign policy are a part of the process, by no means complete, of attempting to reorganize the direction of the Soviet Union, its relations with the Communist bloc and with the non-Soviet world in the new circumstances created by the death of Stalin. In other words, he says, an attempt to administer a dictatorship without a dictator and an empire without an emperor. He sees no change of heart on the part of the Soviet leaders nor abandonment of ultimate objectives. They are acting, however, in conformity with their concept of immediate Soviet interests and more in response to the pressure of events than was the case in Stalin's time. Bohlen believes that the chief preoccupation of the Soviet government now is to retain maximum degree of control and influence possible and at the same time avoid involvement in a war. [REDACTED]

Soviet propaganda: After a lull in propaganda on the four-power talks, Moscow broadcast to the world on 13 June the texts of the Soviet note agreeing to hold the conference in Geneva on 18 July and the unusual TASS statement in which "authoritative Soviet circles" charged the United States with raising obstacles to the conference. The latter theme continues to receive considerable emphasis and volume. In general discussions of Soviet initiative for the easing of world tension, the joint Soviet-Yugoslav declaration was cited prominently.

Soviet note of 13 June: The American embassy in Moscow described the criticisms of Western views on the lack of an agenda and the duration of summit talks contained in the Soviet note of 13 June as equivocal agreement to Western suggestions on those points. The note is taken as further confirmation of the importance the USSR attaches to the meeting. [REDACTED]

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Implications in Soviet note and TASS release of 13 June: The American embassy in Moscow views the TASS "statement" released at the same time as the Soviet note of 13 June as a device to put forward Soviet views not incorporated in the note itself. In addition to expressing Soviet opposition to discussion of Satellites and international Communism, the TASS statement is noteworthy in that it tends to confirm estimates of subjects the USSR will discuss at the conference, i.e. disarmament, atomic weapons ban, creation of a collective security system in Europe, guaranteeing peace and security in Asia and Far East, and a seat for Communist China in the UN. Germany and reunification are conspicuously absent. The statement implies that Soviet conciliatory actions in the last two months must be matched by the West. [REDACTED]

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Pravda and Izvestia editorials on 15 June closely paraphrase the TASS statement of 13 June. Both editorials recapitulate "real questions of international life" which require discussion at the conference. They attack the alleged American policy of operating from a position of strength and the view that the Satellites and international Communism might be discussed, and they repeat the accusation that the US attitude is "complicating" the situation. A Pravda editorial says the USSR "has already demonstrated" steps to lessen international tension and concludes that "it is now the turn of the Western powers." [REDACTED]

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Molotov's attitude: Molotov, at French foreign minister Pinay's luncheon for him on 9 June, emphasized the Soviet desire for a relaxation of tensions as evidenced by the Austrian treaty, the Belgrade talks, and the invitation to Adenauer. Molotov expressed doubt that goodwill existed in equal measure on the Western side. He referred to recent American comments and specifically to Secretary Dulles' statements about the Satellites and to his 7 June press conference. [REDACTED]

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Conference duration: The American embassy in Moscow comments that the statement in the 13 June Soviet note in connection with Soviet agreement to "beginning" meeting on 18 July may portend Soviet efforts to stretch out the conference. [REDACTED]

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TASS reports from London and Paris on 15 June cover reactions to the Soviet note and give the impression that France and Britain do not oppose a longer conference and that objection is solely on the part of the US. [REDACTED]

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Conference dates: At the luncheon given for him by French foreign minister Pinay on 9 June, Molotov intimated he would have preferred a later date for the Geneva meeting. French Foreign Ministry official Laloy believed Molotov might have wanted Adenauer to visit Moscow before the meeting or possibly to hold French-Soviet talks before the conference. [REDACTED]

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Soviet conference position influenced by leadership question: Norwegian foreign minister Lange said on 13 June that he understands affairs in Moscow are in a great state of flux and he doubts the summit talks will accomplish much until Soviet leadership questions are more settled. Lange thought no one the Russians could put forward at present would be able and willing to commit the USSR in important matters. [REDACTED]

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# Disarmament

Soviet position: Ambassador Bohlen believes that Soviet leaders came to the conclusion sometime in March that a serious effort must be made in the international field to avoid the burdens and consequences of an all-out arms race, and that words and gestures were insufficient. He points out that it does not follow that Soviet leaders would be prepared to agree to the extent of control and inspection essential to make a disarmament agreement workable. There may be, however, a more serious basis for discussion than has existed in the past. [redacted]

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Peaceful uses of atomic energy: The Danish Academy of Science has received a telegram from Moscow asking it to send representatives to a conference of peaceful uses of atomic energy to be held in Moscow on 5 July. [redacted]

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The French Academy of Sciences has received an invitation to send two atomic scientists to an atomic energy meeting in Moscow from 1 July through 5 July with a subsequent two-week trip through the USSR. The French understand that Italy has received a similar offer. The British have informed the French that the royal society received an invitation on 13 June. The French conjecture that this represents a Soviet endeavor to counteract recent United States moves in this field before Geneva. [redacted]

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Soviet propaganda comment during the past week heavily emphasized Soviet achievements in the industrial application of atomic energy and included renewed forecasts that atomic power plants more powerful than the one now in operation will be established "in the near future." From Peiping, accounts of the reorganizing sessions of the CPR Academy of Science now include reports on plans for establishment of a research center for the use of atomic energy in medicine, agriculture and industry. Early results are prophesied because of "sincere Soviet aid."

# Germany

Soviet propaganda (6-12 June): Extensive propaganda support for the Soviet note inviting West German chancellor Adenauer to Moscow stressed the historic advantages of interchange--especially economic--between Germany and the Soviet Union. Broadcasts echoed the note in terming the bid another step in the consistent Soviet effort to lessen international tension. American dismay over the possible effects of the Soviet initiative was said to stem from realization that the West Germans may now perceive the advantages they could derive from nonparticipation in Western defense schemes. Commentators evoked the spectre of the destruction a new war could bring to Germany, while citing the benefits both countries gained from the Treaty of Rapallo. German listeners heard the unique assertion that the Soviet invitation "testifies to the sincere desires of our peoples for letting bygones be bygones." Propaganda widely repeated the note's statement that normalization of relations would contribute to reunification. There was no mention of German neutralization, free all-German elections, disposition of the Oder-Neisse question, or repatriation of German POWs. One East German commentator decried alleged Bonn objections to the representation of two Germanies in Moscow, calling it laudable that the USSR should want good relations with both "actually existing German states" pending reunification. Moscow avoided this issue.

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Soviet policy still being thought out: The assistant editor of the London Times, described as a most intelligent observer of Soviet affairs, has completed a series of articles on his recent and sixth visit to the USSR. The American embassy in London reports the following quotation from his sixth article, published on 11 June: "The chief impression I gained from a number of private informal talks was that Russian policy about Germany was still being thought out. All dwelt on the need to establish a unified, neutral Germany ('prevented solely by Western ill-will'), but some were readier than others to discuss the possibility of a working arrangement for security if, in spite of efforts on each side, German unity were not found possible. Where one or two rejected anything less than unity, saying that the only alternative was an arms race, the others did not reject lesser solutions--for example, the idea of an agreement for limiting arms in the two parts of Germany if unity had to be postponed."

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Status of Soviet military forces: Reports on Soviet zone military rail movements indicate that on 27 April five T/34/85 tanks were moved from Satzkorn to Kaulsdorf, and on 8 May four T/34/85 tanks went from Satzkorn to Schwerin. G-2 USAREUR comments that these shipments represent continued handing over of T-34 tanks from tank divisions to mechanized and rifle divisions, resulting from the import of T-54 tanks to the tank divisions. There is no evidence that any T-34's are being exported. [REDACTED]

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East German-West German relations: East Berlin mayor Ebert wrote to West Berlin mayor Suhr and Speaker of the House Representatives Brandt and declared readiness to have members of East Berlin Magistrat sit down immediately with members of the West Berlin Senat "to negotiate questions raised by both sides." Ebert told the East Berlin city assembly that the basic problem was "German understanding and a common fight against West German remilitarization and the Paris agreements," which he called the principal obstacle to reunification of Germany and thus of Berlin. He further demanded closing of West Berlin "agent and espionage centers" and prohibition of "Fascist" veterans' organizations. American officials in Berlin comment that the Ebert letter is not a new

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development but merely the latest of a series of similar communications (for example, at the times of the Berlin conference and the last Berlin elections) which appeared to be made solely for propaganda purposes or in an attempt to obtain some recognition of the East Berlin administration. They believe there is no precise analogy in this case to Federal Republic GDR negotiations, since Berlin discussions, if kept on a technical level, would merely involve a return to the situation existing in 1948-1952. [REDACTED]

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Soviet-West German relations: Ambassador Bohlen comments that the Soviet invitation to Adenauer was not unexpected, especially after the concession on Austria. Establishment of trade and cultural relations with the Federal Republic was specifically referred to by Molotov at the Berlin conference and the USSR offered to normalize relations in its 15 January declaration.

Bohlen believes that Bonn's recognition of East Germany is still a Soviet objective, and he expects that establishment of relations with the USSR, and later with other Satellites, will increase pressure for such relations. An offer to Bonn might include trade inducements and a plan to improve the Berlin situation. Moscow will try to postpone the unity question, proposing direct East-West German talks. Bohlen interprets the proposal for trade as well as diplomatic relations as a sign that Moscow does not anticipate German unification in the immediate future.

The timing and suggestion that Adenauer should visit Moscow in the "nearest future" suggests to Bohlen that the USSR is anxious to establish relations before the Big Four conference, probably in order to have an additional pretext for avoiding discussion on German unification. [REDACTED]

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Molotov woos French: Molotov, at French foreign minister Pinay's luncheon for him on 9 June, emphasized the community of interest between their countries on European security related to the danger of German rearmament. He suggested bilateral conversations of the subject. French Foreign Ministry official Laloy commented that this Soviet stress on Franco-Soviet community of interest with respect to Germany was an old story which might have an appeal in parliamentary circles, but had no appeal for the Foreign Ministry. [REDACTED]

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### Status of the Satellites

Rumors of Soviet troop withdrawal: Rumors are circulating in Bucharest concerning possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania. There are rumors that the Russians are already selling their personal possessions and leaving Bucharest, that Soviet-controlled airfields are being returned to the Rumanians and that Soviet forces are leaving Constanta and are preparing to return the city to Rumanian control. American legation officials comment that the rumors stem largely from wishful thinking. Soviet vehicle traffic in Bucharest remains constant. [REDACTED]

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### Neutral Belt

Soviet-Yugoslav relations: Soviet propaganda comment on the Belgrade talks fell off sharply during the past week.

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Yugoslav vice president Tempo on 9 June briefed American officials in Belgrade on the economic aspects of the Soviet-Yugoslav talks. Yugoslavia rejected a Soviet offer of aid in the form of 2-percent loans to run 10 to 12 years and told the Russians that indemnification for its 1949 losses would have to be settled before it would talk about accepting loans from the USSR. First Deputy Premier Mikoyan maintained that these loans would serve as indemnification, a position the Yugoslavs rejected. Agreement was then reached to negotiate further at a later date. Tempo commented that he believed Russian policies ran counter in many respects to the statement of principles in the Soviet-Yugoslav declaration and he was very uncertain as to the USSR's desire or ability to implement these principles. [REDACTED]

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The British Foreign Office attributes considerable importance to an interview given to Pravda by Polish premier Cyrankiewicz, in which he welcomes the proposal "to establish free exchange of opinion and socialist experience" with Yugoslavia. The British note, however, that he did not mention that a "different" road to socialism existed. "Thoughtful" Polish commentator Xorxa (Zorza?) commented in the Manchester Guardian on 13 June that free exchange of opinion and socialist experience between Yugoslavia and Poland "could have some very interesting results, especially since Yugoslav opinion about 'socialist experience' imposed by the Soviet Union on Poland is free to the point of abuse." The British Foreign Office working level is inclined to agree with Xorxa that the interview was designed to show this Polish "initiative" had the benediction of the Kremlin as well as to indicate a desire to reach a real settlement first with Yugoslavia and then perhaps with the rest of the world. [REDACTED]

### Related Far East Intelligence

Negotiations on Formosan issue: Some publicity was given in Soviet propaganda to Chou's 10 June interview with Indonesian correspondents, in which he repeated his offer to negotiate with the

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United States. Continued avoidance by Moscow of reference to Krishna Menon's mediation effort is evident from Moscow's failure to mention Formosa in propaganda comment on Nehru's visit. Communist Chinese broadcasts to the home audience continue to avoid discussion of negotiations, but foreign broadcasts cite a Gallup Poll report stating that 74 percent--"a good-sized majority"--of the American people favor talks with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic for a negotiated settlement of the Formosan issue.

The Communist Chinese appear to have an earnest desire for maintaining peace and to negotiate with the U.S. on the Formosa question, according to a member of the Japanese scientific mission which visited China on its way home from Russia.

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Related Near and Middle East intelligence

Nehru's visit to Moscow: There was extensive radio publicity for Nehru's visit to the USSR. Wide distribution was given to Pravda's 7 June editorial stressing the war friendship and affinity between India and the USSR, and commentaries praise India for its "independent" road of development and active espousal of peace, coexistence and noninterference in other countries' internal affairs. In Peiping's propaganda, mostly Indian press material is cited. The only comment, a 10 June People's Daily article signed Observer stresses Soviet-Indian co-operation for peace "irrespective of the two countries' different social systems."

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